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The public understanding of Terri Schiavo's death was re-
fracted through the polarized politics of the abortion wars. By 
the time the Florida legislature intervened in her case in 2004 
and the United States Congress followed suit in 2005, the debate 
surrounding her had become hardened into the familiar antago-
nisms of our times-religion vs. secularism, pro-life vs. pro-
choice, liberals vs. conservatives. On the left, the claim was that 
Terri had chosen to end her life rather than endure the endless 
limbo of her persistent vegetative state but that outsiders were 
attempting to force their own conception of a "life worth living" 
on her; on the right, the claim was that Terri's medical condition 
was uncertain, that she might benefit from some further therapy, 
and that her "right to life" was being scorned by those pressing 
for removal of her feeding tube.1 
This stylized conflict obscured a more immediate issue at 
stake in Terri's case. This issue was presented by the family con-
flict between Terri's husband, Michael Schiavo, and her parents, 
Robert and Mary Schindler, about the continuance of Terri's 
life-prolonging medical treatment. The issue was not the sub-
stantive disagreement between them but the simple fact of their 
conflict regardless of its merits. By the time of Terri's death, this 
conflict had escalated beyond any sensible proportions and be-
yond even the most remote possibility of reconciliation between 
them. Thus after Terri's death, following the removal of her 
feeding tube as Michael had sought, her parents were not in-
• Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University. Michael Gottlieb's re-
search assistance has been incisive and essential in writing this article. I have also bene-
fited from discussions with J. Randall Curtis, M.D. 
1. See George J. Annas, 'Culture of Life' Politics at the Bedside- The Case of Terri 
Schiavo, 352 N. ENG. J. MEn. 16 (2005); Anna Quindlen, The Culture of Each Life, 
NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE, April4, 2005, p. 62. 
427 
428 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:427 
formed of the time or location of her burial.2 Soon thereafter, in 
response to the Schindlers' repeated allegations, a criminal in-
vestigation was initiated by Governor Jeb Bush of Florida to de-
termine whether Michael was responsible for injuring Terri fif-
teen years earlier when she suffered her anoxic evene This 
increasingly bitter family conflict was the impetus for the prolif-
erating public engagement as competing advocates for Terri's 
husband and parents sought allies to join their struggle. The fam-
ily conflict was generally understood, however, as merely the 
backdrop for the real issue at stake-that is, whether Terri's 
treatment should be continued. The family conflict was noted by 
Florida courts as the self-evident justification for their initial in-
tervention to render a definitive judgment about Terri's contin-
ued treatment. The need for and propriety of governmental in-
volvement in resolving this dispute was similarly viewed as self-
evident in the subsequent involvement of Florida's governor and 
legislature, and then Congress. The Florida courts rebuffed this 
involvement on the basis of constitutional assertions of judicial 
autonomy;4 the federal courts rapidly disposed of substantive 
claims for which Congress had authorized de novo review.5 But 
none of the courts and virtually none of the other official and 
unofficial disputants about Terri's fate explicitly asked whether 
this family dispute should properly have been resolved in any 
public forum. A principle of family privacy-a principle, I would 
argue, of constitutional dimensions-was thereby dishonored. 
I. PROTECTING TERRI SCHIAVO'S RIGHT TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
Neither Terri's husband nor her parents resisted govern-
mental intervention as such. Michael explicitly claimed that gov-
ernmental assistance was necessary and appropriate to carry out 
Terri's wishes, notwithstanding that she had never completed an 
advance directive or appointed any health care proxy to act on 
her behalf if she became incompetent. The Schindlers asserted 
both in judicial and subsequent legislative proceedings that 
2 Controversy Continues as Terri Schiavo's Remains Interred in Clearwater, June 
20, 2005, http://journals.aoLcomljusticel949/JUSTICEFORTERRISCHIA VO/entries/958. 
3. Florida Closes Its Inquiry Into Collapse of Schiavo, N.Y.TIMES, July 8, 2005, p. 
A20, col. 6 ("In the new report, Mr. [Bernie] McCabe [prosecutor for Pinellas and Pasco 
Counties] said that to open a full homicide investigation, there must be some fact or evi-
dence indicating that a criminal act caused the death. He said his review had found 
none."). 
4. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). 
5. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F. 3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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Terri's medical condition was treatable and on this substantive 
basis argued that state officials should not direct abandonment 
of life-prolonging treatment. Neither Michael nor the Schindlers 
asserted that they were pursuing interests of their own; they 
purported to speak only for and on behalf of Terri. And Florida 
law specified that the only proper focus for inquiry was Terri's 
prior wishes.6 
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court had effectively endorsed 
the proposition that mentally competent individuals have a con-
stitutional right to choose about the continuance of life-
prolonging medical treatment, including artificial feeding.7 The 
Cruzan case itself dealt with an incompetent person who, like 
Terri Schiavo, had left no formal advance indication of her 
wishes; the Court divided on the issue of the quantum of proof 
that a state might require to justify treatment discontinuance, 
with the majority accepting Missouri's specification of "clear and 
convincing evidence." By 2005, virtually every state had legisla-
tively provided that individuals are entitled to specify advance 
directives and/or to appoint health care proxies to direct their 
medical treatment if they should become incompetent. 
Most people, however, do not take advantage of this enti-
tlement8; and for such people, most states provide for automatic 
appointment of a health care proxy based on a fixed statutory 
hierarchy (with spouse first, adult children second, parents third 
and so on). Under most of these state laws, the statutory proxy 
appointment effectively resolves any conflict among family 
members about treatment decisions without any specific inquiry 
about the incompetent patient's actual prior preferences.9 (Some 
6. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). 
7. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
8. See the data cited by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Cruzan, 497 
U.S. at 289 n.l. 
9. See Alabama: Ala. Code 1975 § 22-BA-11 and -6; Alaska: Alaska Stat. 
§ 13.52.030; Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 36-3231; Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann.§ 20-17-
214; California: Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24178; Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, 
§ 2507; Washington, D. C.: D.C. Code 1981 § 21-2210; Florida: Fla. Stat Ann. § 765.401; 
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-2 (informed consent statute) and Ga. Code Ann. § 31-
36A-1 to -7; lllinois: 755 ILCS 40/1 to 40/65, specifically 40/25; Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 144A.7; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.631; Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10; Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann tit. 18-A, § 5-801 to§ 5-817, specifically 
§ 5-805; Maryland: Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann., § 5-605; Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. 
§§ 41-41-201 to -229, particularly §§ 41-41-203(s), -211, and -215(9); Montana: Mont. 
Code Ann.§ 50-9-106; Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 449.626; New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. 
1978 § 24-7A-5; New York: N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2%5; North Carolina: N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 90-322 (assigning priority first to patient's spouse, then to "relatives of the first 
degree"); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 23-12-13; Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
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state laws provide that where the statutory proxy is a multi-
member group-e.g., adult children-any disagreement is con-
clusively resolved by majority vote; and tie votes require ag-
pointment of a different, presumably more resolute, proxy. ) 
The justification for this imposed hierarchy offered by the draft-
ers of the widely influential proposed uniform law was that a 
"presumed majority" would prefer these results.11 If an individ-
ual constitutional right to control one's medical treatment is at 
stake, this rough calculation about majority preference would 
arguably be insufficient; and individualized inquiry might instead 
be required.12 
Florida law cannot, however, be faulted on this ground. 
Though Florida follows other states in providing automatic ap-
pointment of a proxy for incompetent patients who had not 
made their own prior arrangements, Florida explicitly requires 
this appointed proxy to use a "substituted judgment" standard-
that is, to act on the basis of the incompetent patient's prior val-
ues and wishes-in making treatment decisions. Unlike most 
other states, moreover, Florida puts bite into this requirement by 
specifying that any family member who disagrees with the auto-
matically appointed proxy's decision can secure immediate judi-
cial review; and in these proceedings, the incompetent patient's 
wishes must be determined by "clear and convincing evidence. "13 
Thus more explicitly and rigorously than most states, Florida 
seeks to vindicate the incompetent patient's prior intentions. 
It is therefore especially striking that the Florida courts 
truncated their inquiry into Terri's prior wishes by restricting 
§ 2133.08; Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.635 and § 127.505(12) and 127.535(4); South 
Carolina: S.C. Code 1976 Ann. § 44-66-10 to -80; South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws§ 34-
12C-1 to -8; Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann§ 68-11-1801 to -1815, particularly§ 68-11-1806; 
Texas: Tex. [Health & Safety] Code Ann. § 166.039 (providing for joint surrogacy be-
tween supervising physician and family member, according to priority); Utah: Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-1105, -1105.5, -1107; Virginia: Va. Code § 54.1-2986; Washington: Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. § 7.70.065; West Virginia: W. VA. Code Ann. § 16-30-8; Wisconsin: Wise. 
Stat. Ann. § 50.06 (applicable only for certain facility admissions). 
10. See, e.g., Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993), section 5 (c); Fla. Stat. 
765.401(1)(c), (e) (2000). 
11. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act at section 5 (b). See Comment, at p. 16 ("If 
an individual does not designate a surrogate ... subsection (b) applies a default rule for 
selecting a family member to act as a surrogate. Like all default rules, it is not tailored to 
every situation, but incorporates the presumed desires of a majority of those who find 
themselves so situated."). 
12. For consideration of this constitutional claim, see text accompanying notes 31-
36, infra. 
13. Fla. Stat. § 765.105 (2000), In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 
(Fla. 1990), In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176.179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). 
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their attention to Terri's views about life-prolonging medical 
treatment while they failed to ask whether she would have given 
preferential deference to her husband or to her parents in their 
conflict over this question. The courts assumed that Terri would 
simply decide the treatment question for herself without any 
consideration of deference to one or another family member. 
One explanation for this unexamined assumption is that the 
courts were ideologically blinded by the conventional idea of 
autonomy that has taken hold in our legal culture-the idea that 
"autonomous choice" implies a self-regarding rational actor who 
bases his decisions entirely on utilitarian calculation of his own 
self-interest.14 The possibility that Terri Schiavo might have 
wanted to defer to her husband's or to her parent's wishes in 
preference to her own about treatment prolongation simply van-
ishes from this cliched but nonetheless culturally powerful con-
ceptualization. 
The judges of Florida court of appeals revealed the distort-
ing grip of this conventional conceptualization in the opinion 
they rendered in 2003, the fourth of their numerous reviews of 
Terri's case. Judge Chris Altenbemd, writing for the Court, 
stated:15 
The judges on this panel are called upon to make a collective, 
objective decision concerning a question of law. Each of us, 
however, has our own family, our own loved ones, our own 
children. From our review of the videotapes of Mrs. Schiavo, 
despite the irrefutable evidence that her cerebral cortex has 
sustained the most severe of irreparable injuries, we under-
stand why a parent who had raised and nurtured a child from 
conception would hold out hope that some level of cognitive 
function remained. If Mrs. Schiavo were our own daughter, 
we could not but hold to such a faith. 
But in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that 
loving parents have for their children. It is about Theresa 
Schiavo's right to make her own decision, independent of her 
parents, and independent of her husband. In circumstances 
such as these, when families cannot agree, the law has opened 
the doors of the circuit courts to permit trial judges to serve as 
surrogates or proxies to make decisions about life-prolonging 
14. This is the so-called "unencumbered self' critically examined by Michael Sandel 
in DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARGI OF A PuBUC PHILOSOPHY 
(1996). 
15. Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Guardianship of Schiavo), 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2003). 
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procedures .... It is a necessary function if all people are to be 
entitled to a personalized decision ... independent of the sub-
jective and conflicting assessments of their friends and rela-
tives .... 
At the conclusion of our first opinion we stated: In the final 
analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was 
whether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo ... would choose to 
continue the constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in 
hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her missing 
brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural 
death process to take its course and for her family members 
and loved ones to be free to continue their lives. 
This is a heart-felt statement. The formal solemnity of Judge 
Altenbemd's reference to "Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo" 
testifies to his appreciation of the gravity of his court's role. 
He is admirably open in acknowledging the conflict that he 
and the other judges on the panel feel between their commit-
ment to "objectivity" and their subjective understanding and 
sympathy with the unwillingness, even the inability, of Terri's 
parents to abandon hope for her. "If Mrs. Schiavo were our own 
daughter, we could not but hold to such a faith." But Judge Al-
tenbemd failed to see that Terri herself might have extended the 
same sympathetic understanding to her parents and might have 
resolved to act on that understanding. In the sad light of her par-
ents' desperate clinging to her, Terri might have decided that "in 
the end, this case is ... about the aspirations that loving parents 
have for their children." Terri might have concluded that she 
could best honor their love by deferring to their passionate wish 
that she remain alive, notwithstanding the gravity of her impair-
ment. Would she insist on dying-as Judge Altenbemd imag-
ined-to "permit ... her family members and loved ones to be 
free to continue their lives," if they pleaded with her that they 
did not want this freedom? 
Framing the question in these terms would not, of course, 
have simplified the judges' task. It would have vastly, even hope-
lessly, complicated their proclaimed effort to implement her val-
ues and preferences. If they had concluded that Terri valued 
loyalty to her family more than any isolated calculation of her 
own self-interest (or, more precisely, that her conception of self-
interest included honoring others in a loving relationship with 
her), the judges must then decide how Terri would have ranked 
the conflicting requests from her parents and her husband. 
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The irrebuttable presumption in most state laws preferring 
spouses over parents as automatic proxies overlooks the dra-
matic alteration in the psychology of intimate relationships that 
occurs when a previously competent adult becomes incompetent 
and entirely dependent on others for caretaking. This status ech-
oes the utter dependency of childhood and the centrality of the 
parent-child relationship. Spouses can, of course, adapt to their 
adult partner's altered status. But parents have already experi-
enced this dependency relationship and can often renew it more 
readily than a spouse and, for this reason alone, might well be 
preferred by the now-incompetent, childish adult. Even the adult 
children of a now-incompetent adult have had more direct ex-
perience of a dependency relationship than the spouse and, for 
this reason alone, might be more capable and more welcomed in 
reversing caretaking roles with their now-needy parent. Thus it is 
not at all clear that a "presumed majority" of adults, if rendered 
incompetent, would conclusively prefer their spouse to their 
parents or their adult children as health care proxy. 
Terri might have provided unambiguous guidance for an-
swering this question if she had previously appointed her hus-
band or her parents as her health-care proxy. She had not done 
so; and though, as noted, Florida law filled in this blank for her, 
it also provided that other family members could challenge her 
spouse/proxy's decisions, requiring a demonstration in court of 
"clear and convincing evidence" about her wishes. The question 
thus presented was whether Terri would have preferred to be 
seen as a "loving wife" or a "loving daughter" in circumstances 
where she was obliged to choose between these two intensely 
valued self-depictions. 
According to testimony in the 2000 probate court proceed-
ing, Terri had discussed with various relatives and friends the 
possibility that she would become incompetent and dependent 
on life-prolonging technology. But there was no testimony that 
she had ever anticipated conflict between her husband and her 
parents about her reliance on such technology. By all accounts, 
Terri, Michael and the Schindlers had been closely and harmo-
niously involved with one another, not only before Terri's cere-
brovascular accident in 1990 but for some three years thereafter. 
When they first married in1984, Terri and Michael lived in her 
parents' house in Philadelphia. In 1986, the couple moved to 
Florida and lived rent-free in a condominium owned by the 
Schindlers; a year later, the Schindlers themselves decided to 
move to St. Petersburg near Terri and Michael who, by then, had 
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moved into their own home. In 1991, immediately following 
Terri's hospitalization, Michael and the Schindlers jointly pur-
chased and moved together into a larger home which, they an-
ticipated, would be suitable for Terri's caretaking when she had 
recovered sufficiently to leave the hospital.16 It is thus unlikely 
that Terri ever imagined even hypothetically the prospect that 
she might have to choose between her husband and her parents 
in determining her own preference for life-prolonging treatment. 
The breach in the relationship between Michael and the 
Schindlers first erupted in 1993. The occasion was a disagree-
ment about the disposition of funds which Michael had obtained 
in a medical malpractice lawsuit he had initiated on Terri's be-
half, successfully claiming that her physicians' negligence in pre-
scribing a weight-loss diet for her had been responsible for her 
anoxic event. Terri had been awarded $700,000 in damages on 
her own account and Michael received $300,000 for his loss of 
consortium with Terri. In 1993, a heated conversation took place 
between Michael and Robert Schindler about the disposition of 
the loss of consortium funds. In his testimony seven years later, 
Michael asserted that Terri's father had demanded some portion 
of those funds notwithstanding the absence of any legal basis for 
his demand.17 (Florida law provided no compensable damages 
for parents based on injuries suffered by their adult children 
unless there were no other related survivors.18) Robert Schindler 
subsequently explained that he sought some substantial portion 
of the award to Michael, not on his own account but to assure 
that additional funds would be available for Terri's medical care 
since Michael had recently begun a romantic relationship with 
another woman with whom he subsequently resided and fa-
thered two children.19 
Viewing this breach in its most sympathetic perspective on 
Michael's side, by 1993 it was apparent that he had permanently 
lost any possibility of renewing an intimate relationship with his 
wife; his decision to become romantically involved with another 
woman did not diminish his grief or his belief in his moral and 
16. See transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 23, 28, 33, File No. 90-2908GD-
003, arcuit Court for Pinellas County, florida, Probate Division, January 24,2000. a. the 
following exchange between Michael and his attorney: "0. [H]ow would you describe the 
relationship you and Terri had with Mr. and Mrs. Schindler? ... A. ... In my own opinion, I 
thought we were pretty close." ld. at 35. 
17. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 58-60. 
18. Fla. Stat. § 768.21 (2000). 
19. E-mail from Barbara Weller (bweller@gibbsfirm.com) to Robert Burt, May 14, 
2005,11:15 am (on file with author). 
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legal entitlement to compensation for the medical negligence re-
sponsible for his loss. Viewed most sympathetically on the 
Schindlers' side, it was clear by 1993 that Terri's need for inten-
sive medical care would be prolonged and increasingly costly; 
while Michael might be justified in "continuing his life" in light 
of Terri's grim condition, it was plausible for them to believe 
that he was morally obliged to leave her with the funds he had 
obtained because of his relationship with her, in order to help 
meet her extraordinary medical needs which prompted his ac-
tions in seeking out another conjugal relationship. 
It was not until 1999 that the dispute between Michael and 
the Schindlers moved into the Florida courts. But disagreements 
between them about Terri's treatment erupted virtually immedi-
ately after this first breach. In 1994, Terri developed a bladder 
infection and, acting on the diagnosing physician's advice, Mi-
chael decided as her appointed proxy that antibiotic treatment 
be withheld. This determination brought fierce objections from 
the Schindlers as well as from staff of the nursing home where 
Terri was a patient; and Michael relented. In the 2000 probate 
court proceeding, Michael testified about this prior episode:20 
Q. Back then in ... 1994, ... why didn't you pursue removal 
of the feeding tube? 
A. Because at that time my emotions were running. I 
couldn't-I was ready to do the natural thing. I was not ready 
to pull the feeding tube at that time. 
Q. Even though you knew Terri wanted it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why were you not able? 
A. It was- I was not ready for that yet. 
This testimony offers a glimpse of an underlying question 
that inevitably accompanies all decision-making about terminal 
illnesses: the question when all of the participants-the patient 
herself and her family members-are emotionally prepared to 
accept the permanent severance of their relationships and the 
finality of death.21 This is a wrenching decision for everyone in-
20. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony, pp. 69-70. 
21. The special difficulty for this acceptance regarding a family member in a persis-
tent vegetative state (as Terri Schiavo had been diagnosed) is shown in this account by 
436 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:427 
volved. The patient, if she is mentally competent, may choose to 
disregard or override others' suffering by accepting her death 
before they are prepared to do so; and there can be clear moral 
warrant for this choice. But it is a choice, and it does have inevi-
table consequences on the lives of survivors. 
Because it is so wrenching for everyone, these decisions are 
often accompanied by conflict-sometimes subdued, sometimes 
floridly expressed-among patients (if they are able to interact), 
families and physicians. Skilled clinicians can frequently help the 
involved participants to work their way through to some mutu-
ally agreed decisions; but some conflicts do remain raw and un-
resolvable. n The American legal system has struggled since the 
the attorney for Nancy Cruzan's family who, unlike the Schindlers, were determined to 
obtain judicial authorization for removing her life-prolonging feeding tube. In his book, 
LoNG GOODBYE: THE DEA1HS OF NANCY CRUZAN (2002), at pp. 131-32, William 
Colby describes a bedside examination of Nancy by Dr. Ronald Cranford to confirm, in 
preparation for his court testimony, that she was in a persistent vegetative state; also at 
the bedside was a Public Broadcasting System television crew that the Cruzan family had 
enlisted to help them in their efforts to have Nancy's feeding tube removed. Colby wrote: 
Nancy's room had been filled with lawyers for both sides, the PBS crew, her 
family and friends and doctors from [the hospital staff]. Joe watched from one 
side of her bed, and Dr. Cranford moved to the other side .... He talked loudly. 
"Nancy? Nancy. Hear me? Look at me, Nancy." He waited for a response, 
but Nancy did not move .... Cranford next grabbed hold of Nancy's stiff right 
leg and tried to bend it straight. She grimaced. Then he reached for the soft skin 
on the inside of the upper part of her right arm, and held the pinch. Slowly, as if 
she were a robot, Nancy's head lifted off the bed and turned. Her face locked on 
her father's for about ten seconds, before she lowered just as slowly to the pil-
low. 
"That's what really concerns you, when she looks like she looks?" Cranford 
said to Joe, as he held the pinch. "That's all involuntary, even though it looks 
like she's looking right at you, doesn't it, huh?" Cranford asked, talking fast as 
he typically did. 
"Right," Joe said, not sounding too sure. 
"But you know she's not?" 
"Right." Watching that scene, I thought, How could any layperson believe at 
that moment that Nancy Cruzan was doing anything besides looking at her fa-
ther? That deception is part of the extreme cruelty of the persistent vegetative 
state for loved ones left behind. For doctors who deal with PVS, though, the 
grimacing and movement is simply another part of the diagnosis-primitive re-
flex reactions from a brain stem still intact, but not any indication of higher 
brain function. 
For families, watching these simple reflexive movements often remains emo-
tionally devastating to witness, and Cranford's exam appeared extremely diffi-
cult for Joe Cruzan, even though Nancy had been in this state for so many years. 
As the PBS camera turned off at the end of the exam, tears came to Joe's eyes 
and fell onto his cheeks. It seemed that he'd been trying to avoid crying with the 
camera directly on him. 
22. See J. Randall Curtis, et al., Missed Opportunities during Family Conferences 
about End-of-Life Care in the Intensive Care Unit, 171 AM J. REsPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 
844 (2005); J. Way, A. L. Back & J.R. Curtis, Withdrawing Life Support and Resolution 
of Conflict with Families," 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1342 (2002). 
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landmark decision of the New 1 ersey Supreme Court in the 
Karen Quinlan23 case to devise an appropriate role for courts in 
decision-making for incompetent patients. Quinlan itself did not 
involve an intra-familial conflict; Karen's entire family were 
agreed that her respirator should be removed but hospital offi-
cials refused to accept this course without a protective court or-
der. The most widely cited subsequent cases addressing a 
claimed "right to die" for competent or incompetent patients 
similarly have not involved family conflict but rather conflicts 
with physicians or state officials.24 
Florida, as noted, is one of the few states to have enacted 
legislation that explicitly addresses the possibility of family con-
flict.25 When Michael had finally decided that he was prepared to 
insist on removal of Terri's feeding tube, he took the initiative in 
seeking probate court review because he knew her parents 
would object. In practical terms, the Florida legislative scheme 
meant that decision-making for incompetent patients remained a 
family matter only so long as there was unanimous agreement 
among family members. At the moment, however, when one 
family member disagrees with the others with sufficient ada-
mance to seek judicial involvement, the probate judge displaces 
the family as dispositive decision-maker. To be sure, the judge is 
obliged by the statute to exercise "substitute judgment," to effec-
tuate the incompetent patient's prior preferences; and for this 
purpose, the judge takes proffered testimony from family mem-
bers and friends. But Florida law specified that when Michael 
sought probate court review, he necessarily and irrevocably 
placed the judge in charge of making treatment decisions for 
Terri. The Florida Court of Appeals made this clear in Terri's 
case a year after the probate judge's initial order had been en-
tered: 
[T]he parties in this emotional case have overlooked the na-
ture of the order entered on February 11, 2000 .... The order 
is not a standard legal judgment, but an order in the nature of 
a mandatory injunction compelling certain actions by the 
guardian and, indirectly, by the health care providers .... 
[T]he trial court was not actually giving the guardian discre-
tion on whether to discontinue the life-prolonging procedures. 
23. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
24. See the extensive list of state cases discussed in the Court's opinion in Cruzan, 
497 U.S. at 269-75. 
25. See supra note 13. 
438 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 22:427 
The guardian was obligated to obi,Y the circuit court's deci-
sion and discontinue the treatment. 
Until the moment in March 2005 when Terri's feeding tube 
was withdrawn, the popular press portrayed this dispute as a 
continuing conflict between Terri's husband and parents. But 
this was wrong. The parents were in conflict with the probate 
judge; Michael was no longer his wife's guardian except in an 
empty, formal sense. The trial court was in charge.Z7 As the 
Court of Appeals admitted, "It may be unfortunate that when 
families cannot agree, the best forum we can offer for this pri-
vate, personal decision is a public courtroom and the best deci-
sion-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior knowledge of 
the ward, but the law currently provides no better solution ... " 
More is lost in the public proceeding than the family's pri-
vacy from public view; and more is lost than the control assumed 
over these familial decisions by a randomly assigned stranger. 
Any possible family conversations about Terri's future become 
frozen in a remote abstraction hardly recognizable as the way 
that empathic human beings should interact with one another. 
Once the judge resolved the conflicting testimony about Terri's 
wishes, once he concluded that she had decided years earlier that 
she would not want the feeding tube, there was no way that any-
one could turn back or have second thoughts. The Schindlers 
could no longer appeal for understanding from their son-in-law 
that, just as he had not been "ready" to see Terri's treatment 
discontinued in 1994, they were still not ready. Even in the 
unlikely event that this possibility of empathic understanding 
from their son-in-law seemed worth pursuing, it could make no 
difference. Michael was no longer responsible for Terri's treat-
ment; the judge was in command. Indeed, the very availability of 
judicial intervention created disincentives for conflicting family 
members to interact with one another on a face-to-face basis. In 
the 2000 probate court hearing, Michael testified that since their 
open breach in 1993, he and the Schindlers had never spoken di-
rectly; they only saw one another and conversed-if one could 
26. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551,558 (2d DCA Fla. 2001). 
27. In the final proceedings before Terri's death, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
11th Circuit misunderstood this fact in holding that withdrawal of her feeding tube was 
not "state action" because Michael Schiavo had merely obtained judicial authorization 
for his decision to terminate treatment. Schiavo ex rei. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 
1289, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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call it that-in the conflicting testimony they offered in the judi-
cial proceedings.28 
The Florida court of appeals ruefully observed that, in re-
sponse to family conflict about treatment choices for an incom-
petent patient, "the best decision-maker we can provide is a 
judge with no prior knowledge of the ward, but the law currently 
provides no better solution." 
There is, however, a better solution than Florida law pro-
vided. The law should not have intervened to settle any dispute 
among family members about whether to withdraw medical 
treatment from an incompetent patient when the disputed action 
would lead to the patient's death. Life-prolonging treatment 
should be withdrawn only when all involved members of the pa-
tient's family agree. If there is dissent among the family, then 
life-prolonging treatment should be continued. There should be 
no option to take this dispute away from the family and have it 
conclusively resolved by some outsider, whether a judge or some 
other stranger such as panel of physicians or a hospital ethics 
committee. 
There is a role for outsiders-that is, to counsel the family 
members, to facilitate conversation among them that might lead 
to some consensus. But this counseling role is radically different 
from what Florida law prescribes in supplanting the family with a 
judge; it is also radically different from the laws of most other 
states in appointing one member of the family as health care 
proxy and thereby effectively favoring him in any family dispute, 
notwithstanding the incompetent patient's prior failure to make 
this choice. 
II. PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FAMILY 
PRIVACY IN TERRI SCHIA YO'S CASE 
As a matter of practical experience, there is good reason to 
believe that prolonged family disputes about withdrawing treat-
ment are quite rare. Disputes do occur, within families or be-
tween families and physicians;29 but these disputes are typically 
28. Transcript of Michael Schiavo's testimony at p. 63. 
29. See C. M. Breen, et al., Conflict Associated with Decisions to Limit Life-
Sustaining Treatment in Intensive Care Units, 16 J. GEN'L INT. MED. 283 (2001); K. 
H.Abbot, et al., Families Looking Back: One Year after Discussion of Withdrawal or 
Withholding of Life-Sustaining Suppon, 29 CRrr.CARE MED. 197 (2001); M.D. Fetters, L. 
Churchill & M. Danis, Conflict Resolution at End of Life, 29 CRrr. CARE MED. 921 
(2001). 
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resolved in days or at most weeks. In medical settings with most 
experience in these matters, skilled, effective clinicians are avail-
able to counsel families and assist them in avoiding the kind of 
pitched battle that developed in Terri Schiavo's case. According 
to published accounts as well as informal conversations that I 
have had with many clinicians involved in end-of-life care, the 
vast majority-well over 95% -of family disputes are resolved in 
this way.30 As a practical matter, moreover, the availability of le-
gal intervention can distort the interaction among the disputing 
family members. As the Schiavo case illustrates, the very avail-
ability of the judge as a back-up decision-maker tempts some or 
all of the disputants to cut off conversation and only "tell it to 
the judge." 
Family resistance may, on occasion, obstruct the capacity of 
health care providers to avert painful conditions or abusive in-
flictions on incompetent patients. Families (or some members of 
families) may resist appropriate use of opioids to alleviate pain 
or may insist on aggressive CPR, involving the likelihood of bro-
ken bones, when such interventions are demonstrably unable to 
prolong life. This kind of abuse is not unique to intra-family con-
flicts; it may occur even with unanimity among family members. 
In either event, coercive state intervention is justified to override 
family wishes in order to remedy this abuse. 
But this kind of justifiable intervention is not at stake in the 
circumstances of the Schiavo case. The rationale for the Schiavo 
intervention is to remedy dignitary injury, to ensure that the in-
competent patient's prior wishes and values are honored not-
withstanding her failure to have formally specified her intentions 
in advance. Where there is disagreement among family mem-
bers, and no formal prior indication of preference by the patient 
for one of the disputants, the patient's dignitary interest in hav-
ing her prior wishes honored is considerably attenuated by the 
inevitable difficulty in determining her prior wishes with any 
reasonable degree of certainty. Even where patients have previ-
ously completed advance directives, empirical studies indicate 
that most patients would want their prior instructions disre-
garded in deference to the contrary wishes of their families and 
physicians. 31 
30. See supra note 22. 
31. In the most extensive empirical investigation of this question, the researchers 
found that some seventy-eight percent of seriously ill patients expressed this preference. 
C.M. Puchalski, et al., Patients Who Want Their Family and Physician to Make Resuscita-
tion Decisions for Them: Observations from SUPPORT and HELP, 48 J. AMER. 
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The fundamental question in designing legal responses to 
family disagreement about life-prolonging treatment for an in-
competent patient is not whether the state should value prolon-
gation of life over death no matter what quality of life might 
thereby be preserved. The fundamental question is whether the 
state should value the specific wishes of family members for pro-
longation over those members opposed to prolongation where 
the incompetent patient has left no clear prior instruction, where 
the patient's suffering from prolongation is limited to dignitary 
injury and where considerable emotional suffering will be im-
posed on different family members as a result either of prolonga-
tion or termination of her life. "Practicality" gives no answer to 
this question. Some means for choosing between either prolon-
gation or discontinuation of the patient's life must of course be 
provided for this binary decision. There are, however, many 
equally practicable but different means available for making this 
choice: judicial fact-finding, automatic appointment of a family 
member based on status rather than substantive commitment to 
prolongation or discontinuation of treatment, a default rule that 
provides for prolongation of treatment until all intimately af-
fected family members agree. 
Indeed, in response to a family dispute or dispute between 
family and clinicians, it would be practicable to resolve the ques-
tion of prolongation or termination by the flip of a coin. Momen-
tarily imagining a state law to this effect provides an entry point 
for considering whether state legislatures are free to adopt any 
conceivable technique for conflict resolution or whether there 
are some values of constitutional dimension that must govern 
legislative choice. 
My own intuition is that a publicly dictated decision be-
tween life and death based on a coin flip would be literally too 
flippant, too inattentive to the gravity of the decision. A coin flip 
would be so erratic and irrational in its impact as to violate the 
very idea of law. The randomness of state mechanisms for im-
posing death was the central flaw that the Supreme Court identi-
fied in overturning all extant capital punishment laws in Furman 
v. Georgia.32 Termination of life-prolonging treatment is not im-
position of a criminal penalty; but Furman rested much more on 
equal protection than on the Eighth Amendment command 
against cruel and unusual punishment. On this ground, state-
GERIATRIC Soc. S84 (2000). 
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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imposed coin flips to resolve family disputes about termination is 
surely as arbitrary-as much reliant on a random "lightning 
strike"33 -as the processes condemned in Furman. 
Is resolution of a family dispute about termination by auto-
matic appointment of one of the disputants-without any atten-
tion to the merits of the dispute or the prior wishes of the in-
competent subject of the dispute-any less arbitrary than a coin 
fli ? p. 
In the absence of any dispute, it is surely not arbitrary for a 
state to choose one relative rather than other plausible candi-
dates to make medical decisions on behalf of an incompetent pa-
tient. Requiring concurrence for any decision among an entire 
family has at least two undesirable consequences. First, it is diffi-
cult, often even imponderable, to determine as an abstract 
proposition who might be eligible for the status of "family." 
Should genealogical charts dictate the result? If so, what degree 
of relationship should be requisite for assembling the collective 
decision-makers-through first cousins? What about in-laws? 
And so forth. 
A common-sense determination of "family member" is pos-
sible, however, where automatic appointment of one member (a 
spouse, say) serves only as a default rule which is overridden if 
an actual dispute arises about terminating treatment. The erup-
tion of an actual dispute in itself connotes that all of the dispu-
tants feel some intense connection to the patient and the specific 
participants in the dispute can thus be identified as "family" so 
long as there is some prior emotionally involved relationship (so 
as to exclude intrusions from the "officious intermeddlers" 
spawned by the polarized politics of our time ).34 
Second, if some listed assemblage of "family members" 
rather than a single appointee were required from the outset, be-
33. As Justice Stewart pungently characterized the irrational imposition of capital 
punishment, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
34. The practical effect of this default rule would serve the goal that the Supreme 
Court has identified in its decisions providing constitutional protection to relations be-
tween biological parents and children; the Court has held that actual day-to-day in-
volvement with children's lives rather than a biological connection is the key for deter-
mining a constitutionally protected relationship between parent and child. See Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In envisioning some 
degree of constitutional protection against state termination of foster parents' custody, 
the Court similarly gave weight to the actuality of relations with the foster children. 
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("(Where] the foster family ... hold[s] the 
same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill[s] the same socializin~ func-
tion as a natural family, ... we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of 
unrelated individuals.") 
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fore any termination dispute had arisen, this could in itself tend 
to breed disputes by imposing responsibility on some family 
member who otherwise would have been disengaged from the 
decisions. Automatic appointment of a single proxy as a default 
rule in itself serves as a marker for the intensity of other family 
members' commitment. If, that is, an "actual dispute" is required 
to override the default appointment of, say, the spouse, this re-
quirement in effect serves as a screening mechanism for demon-
strating a personally intense stake in the termination decision by 
other family members because they must take an initiative to 
participate in the decision. These considerations thus indicate 
the rationality of a state law appointing one family member as 
proxy decision-maker, so long as there is no actual dispute 
within the family about such decisions. When an actual dispute 
arises, however, the automatic appointment mechanism fails ut-
terly to satisfy even a minimal test for rationality. 
But more than minimal rationality should be required to 
justify state interventions in family disputes about terminating 
life-prolonging treatment for incompetent patients. Three differ-
ent pathways can lead to this heightened scrutiny. The first 
pathway was initially charted by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in its landmark Quinlan ruling. In that case, the court began by 
holding that a competent patient had a constitutional right to 
choose whether to accept or discontinue life-prolonging medical 
treatment. Karen Ann Quinlan was, of course, not competent to 
make this choice; but the court ruled that her incompetence was 
not an acceptable basis for depriving her of her constitutional 
right. In order to vindicate her right, the court held, some legal 
mechanism must be provided for determining what decision she 
would have made if she were competent.35 
The Quinlan decision generated an outpouring of judicial 
rulings and legislation in other states, essentially endorsing its 
mandate. Some fifteen years later, this widespread effective rati-
fication of the Quinlan decision was explicitly cited by the U. S. 
Supreme Court in Cruzan as the basis for its assumption that a 
competent person had a constitutional right to dictate with-
drawal of treatment, including artificial provision of nutrition 
and hydration.36 The question specifically at issue in Cruzan was 
whether states could require "clear and convincing" evidence 
35. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ.10, 41-42,355 A.2d 647,664 (1976). 
36. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 275 (1990) ("The princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."). 
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rather than a mere preponderance before concluding that an in-
competent patient would have chosen to discontinue life-
prolonging treatment. While the Court majority held that this 
higher burden of proof did not violate the Constitution, the 
question presented was not whether the state was obliged to give 
some dispositive weight to an incompetent patient's prior wishes; 
the Court ruled only that states had discretion in specifying the 
quantum of proof necessary for determining those wishes. 
The Court at least implied, however, that the state was 
obliged to "safeguard the personal element of this choice" be-
tween "life and death" for an incompetent person.37 Justice 
O'Connor, moreover, specifically concurred in the Court's opin-
ion with the explicit suggestion that the state was affirmatively 
obliged to provide some effective mechanism for determining an 
incompetent patient's actual wishes.38 Automatic appointment of 
proxy for an incompetent person who had indicated no prior 
preference for this proxy would not in itself be sufficient to pro-
tect an incompetent patient's constitutional right to choose 
medical treatment. 
A second pathway for heightened scrutiny can be deduced 
from the constitutionally protected status of family relationships 
as such. Insofar as a constitutionally protected family relation-
ship exists with an incompetent patient, the state cannot exclude 
that family member from decisions about the death of that pa-
tient without some specific, highly persuasive basis.39 The strong-
est case for such a protected participation in decision-making, 
based on existing precedents, is for spouses and for parents of 
minor children. Thus for spouses, the clearly established consti-
tutional right to marry necessarily implies state deference to the 
spouses' mutual wish to continue the relationship;40 when one 
spouse becomes incompetent, this in itself provides no warrant 
for the state to impose termination of the relationship (whether 
37. 497 U.S. at 280. 
38. 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I ... write separately to emphasize 
that the Court does not today decide the issue whether a State must also give effect to 
the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker .... In my view, such a duty may well be con-
stitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treat-
ment."). 
39. Thus, for example, where a husband's beating was responsible for his wife's co-
matose condition and termination of life-prolonging treatment would escalate criminal 
charges from assault to murder, the husband's obvious conflict of interest should disqual-
ify him from decision-making authority. 
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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through divorce or through death) over the other spouse's objec-
tion. 
For parents of minor children, there is also well-established 
constitutional grounds for requiring presumptive state deference 
to parental child-rearing decisions generally.41 The state's re-
sponsibility to preserve parental relations with their minor chil-
dren would seem to create an almost absolute barrier to state-
imposed termination of a child's life-prolonging treatment.42 
Many circumstances might be imagined where parental control 
of medical decisions would disserve their child's interest; refusal 
of state-required vaccination is the most commonly cited exam-
ple from the constitutional case-law.43 But it is difficult to imag-
ine plausible invocation by the state of the child's best interest in 
overriding parental wishes to continue life-prolonging treat-
ment.44 
To identify a constitutional basis for requiring state defer-
ence to the wishes of a spouse or minor child's parent for life-
prolonging medical treatment does not necessarily imply equal 
deference for their wishes to terminate treatment. The underly-
ing basis for the constitutional guarantee is not for spousal or pa-
rental control over another person's life. The underlying basis is 
to honor spousal or parental interests in the preservation of their 
protected relationship with that person. Death ends the relation-
ship. The willingness of a spouse or parent themselves to end 
their relationship by directing termination of life-prolonging 
treatment is not inherently wrong or even suspect. But that will-
ingness does open the possibility that the state is entitled to as-
sert its contrary communal interest in preserving the life of the 
spouse or child. So, for example, the state can legitimately act to 
protect a child with Downs Syndrome whose parents refuse to 
authorize life-prolonging surgery, as in the notorious 1982 Indi-
41. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
42. Compare Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), requiring the heightened 
standard of "clear and convincing evidence" before the state may remove a child from 
her parent's custody. In Cruzan, the Court drew a direct analogy between this constitu-
tional requirement established by Santosky and decisions to terminate life-prolonging 
medical treatment. 497 U.S. at 284. 
43. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
44. Extreme examples justifying state override of parental decisions against termi-
nating life-prolonging treatment might, for example, be an abusive parent resisting his 
child's death to avoid criminal prosecution for murder, as discussed supra note 39 regard-
ing an abusive husband, or parental insistence on the infliction of pain and physical injury 
to perform CPR in a palpably impossible effort to prolong the life of an imminently ter-
minal child. 
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ana Baby Doe case.45 So too, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Cruzan, the state is not obliged to defer to parents' wishes to 
terminate life-prolonging treatment merely based on their status 
as parents.46 
Even assuming that the Constitution does protect the life-
prolonging wishes of a spouse or minor child's parent, there is no 
direct case-law support for finding similar protection for the par-
ents of an adult child. But if we look beyond what the Supreme 
Court has disparagingly called "narrowly defined family pat-
terns, "('I we can see a broader conception of family relationships 
for which the Court has demanded constitutional respect-a 
conception that would readily include the relationship between 
parents and adult children. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance which had the effect 
of forbidding Mrs. Moore from sharing her house with her adult 
son, his child and her grandchild by another adult child. The 
Court focused attention on the relationship between grand-
mother and grandchild in invalidating this peculiar ordinance; 
but its reasoning extends beyond this. Thus the Court stated: 
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the 
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradi-
tion of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents 
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots 
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional rec-
ognition .... [T]he accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained 
over the centuries and honored throughout our history, ... 
supports a larger conception of the family .... Especially in 
times of adversity, such as the death of a spouse or economic 
need, the broader family has tended to come together for mu-
tual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home 
life.48 
This same respect for "the broader family" was evident in 
the landmark Quinlan ruling where the New Jersey Supreme 
Court explicitly insisted-and "repeated," as they said, "for the 
sake of emphasis and clarity"- that, notwithstanding the status 
of Karen Ann's father as her legally appointed guardian, any de-
cision to terminate her life-prolonging treatment must be based 
45. See ROBERT A. BURT, DEATII IS THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECfiONS 
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE 161--62 (2002). 
46. 497 U.S. at 285--86. 
47. Moore v. City of East Oeveland, 431 U.S. 495,506 (1977). 
48. I d. at 504-{)5. 
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on "the concurrence of [her] guardian and family. "49 The Quin-
lan court did not identify the constitutional basis for this re-
quirement; it was in uncharted territory in 1976. But in our un-
derstanding of the roots of the constitutional rule that has 
emerged from Quinlan,50 it is important to see the New Jersey 
court's assumption that concurrence among the family of an in-
competent patient, and not simply the decision of one legally 
recognized "head of household," was essential for legitimating 
the momentous decision to withdraw life-prolonging treatment 
from an incompetent adult. 
If the state is constitutionally required presumptively to de-
fer to the wishes of any family member for continuation of life-
prolonging treatment of an adult child but not required to give 
equal deference even to a unanimous family wish for termina-
tion, a clear direction emerges for responding to family disputes 
such as the Schiavo case.51 Like any constitutionally based com-
mand, this required deference to any family member's insistence 
on life-prolongation could be rebutted in specific cases by some 
sufficiently weighty state interest. With one exception, however, 
it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where the state could 
adequately justify imposing death on an incompetent patient 
over the objections of a family member. If the patient were suf-
fering considerable pain, this could always be remedied by some 
drug regime.52 In any event, patients in a persistent vegetative 
state, as Terri Schiavo was diagnosed, do not experience any 
pain; this incapacity is one of the hallmarks of the diagnosis. 
The one exception which could justify a state command for 
termination of life-prolonging treatment is to honor the incom-
petent patient's clear prior directive that, in the event of conflict 
among family members, she had specified who should prevail 
over others and that person was pressing for termination of 
49. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55,355 A.2d 647,671 (1976) (emphasis added). 
50. The "seminal" status of Quinlan was explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
51. a. the Supreme Court's approval in Cruzan of a constitutionally relevant dis-
tinction between decisions to provide and to terminate life-prolonging treatment, suffi-
cient to justify the added burden of proof by the state for termination decisions. Citing 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Court stated, "In Santosky, one of the fac-
tors which led the Court to require proof by clear and convincing evidence in a proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights was that a decision in such a case was final and irrevoca-
ble. Santosky, supra, at 759. The same must surely be said of the decision to discontinue 
hydration and nutrition of a patient such as Nancy Cruzan, which all will agree will result 
in her death." 497 U.S. at 284. 
52. See BURT, supra note 45, at 216-17 nn. 11-15. 
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treatmene3 It would not be enough if the patient had previously 
expressed a generalized wish for termination of treatment; I 
would say that the patient must have specifically envisioned fam-
ily conflict and chosen sides in advance. For most people, the 
eruption of family conflict dramatically changes the context of 
prior decisions that they may have reached without clear realiza-
tion that a family member would consider himself grievously in-
jured by that decision. Unless the incompetent patient had ex-
plicitly considered this possibility and rejected its relevance for 
herself, the state interest in vindicating autonomous choice is too 
speculative, too insubstantial, to overcome the moral and emo-
tional force of family reluctance to accepting the patient's 
death. 54 
This insistence on a clear prior directive by the incompetent 
patient conclusively resolving family conflict might seem too 
demanding. It is conceivable, for example, that objection toter-
mination might come from a family member who had been es-
tranged from the patient for a long period of time-long enough 
and bitterly enough that it would be plausible to conclude that 
the patient would not have wanted to defer to the resistance of 
this particular person. This kind of determination would, how-
ever, require detailed factual inquiry into the particularities of 
family relationships. This requirement implicates the third con-
stitutional law pathway that leads to the requirement for state 
deference to, as opposed to forced resolution of, family disputes. 
This third pathway is a process implication arising from the con-
stitutional requirement that the state not intrude on the private 
domain of family relationships. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Troxel v. Granvilli5 
is most directly relevant in establishing this pathway. In that 
case, the state of Washington had enacted legislation providing 
access to court for "any person" challenging parental decisions 
to deny visitation rights with their children; in such proceedings, 
the statute directed the judge to decide the dispute based on the 
53. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that it was "not faced with the 
question of whether a State might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if 
competent and probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a 
desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for her by that 
individual." 497 U.S. at '2E7 n.l2. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor strongly 
suggested that she would endorse such a constitutional rule. ld. at 289-90. 
54. The insubstantiality of this claimed state interest is underscored by the empiri-
cal evidence, cited in note 31, supra, that most patients want their prior directives disre-
garded in deference to the differing views of their families and physicians. 
55. 530 u.s. 57 (2000). 
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"best interests" of the children. The Court invalidated this stat-
ute because of the "breathtakingly broad"56 discretion granted to 
a judge to "award visitation whenever [she] thought [she] could 
make a better decision than a child's parent had done."57 The 
Court left open the possibility of validating a more narrowly 
drawn statute (limited, for example, to disputes between parents 
and grandparents) with more precisely defined standards than 
"best interests of the child" to govern judicial interventions. The 
unstructured breadth of the judicial intervention into family de-
cision-making was the grounds for its invalidation. 
In family disputes about terminating life-prolonging treat-
ment for an incompetent patient, the process requirement that 
state interventions be constrained by clearly defined, limiting 
standards appears virtually impossible to satisfy unless the in-
competent patient herself had previously indicated her prefer-
ence among the disputing parties or if continuation of the life-
prolonging treatment was likely to inflict serious physical pain or 
injury on the patient. As in Terri Schiavo's case, judicial resolu-
tion of a family dispute based solely on the judge's assessment of 
the incompetent patient's dignitary interest in discontinuing 
treatment would not satisfy the process demands in Troxel. 
A further consideration, not present in Troxel, amplifies the 
constitutional importance of state abstention from resolving 
family disputes about life-prolonging treatment. Insofar as de-
termination of an incompetent patient's dignitary interests in 
discontinuing treatment depends on the patient's prior wishes 
and values, a court would inevitably be drawn into fact-finding 
about issues heavily freighted with religious significance for most 
people in American society. Terri Schiavo's case exemplifies 
this; quite aside from the frenzied participation of outsiders in 
the late stages of this dispute, her parents consistently main-
tained that, as an observant Catholic, Terri would never have 
agreed to discontinue her treatment unless it was clear that she 
was already terminally ill. Her husband's insistence that Terri 
would have wanted to accelerate her death if she were in a per-
sistent vegetative state rested on the implicit premise that Catho-
lic Church teachings to the contrary had not been determinative 
for her. The Florida probate judge purported to rest his decision 
exclusively on his findings about Terri's specific intentions; but 
56. I d. at 67 {plurality opinion). 
57. /d. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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in determining her intentions, he could not avoid resolving an 
explicit religious doctrinal dispute. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion and its stricture 
against state-established religions together require that secular 
courts refrain from resolving religious doctrinal disputes. In 
Jones v. Wolf, 58 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle but 
added the proviso that the state might rely on "neutral princi-
ples" to resolve religious disputes so long as those principles 
were framed "in purely secular terms, and [did] not ... rely on 
religious precepts. "59 State reliance on an incompetent patient's 
prior appointment of a health care proxy as the basis for resolv-
ing family disputes about life-prolonging treatment would ap-
pear suitably "neutral"; the state could rely, that is, on the prima 
facie meaning of the prior directive without inquiring into the 
now-incompetent patient's religious or non-religious motivation 
for making this directive. In the absence of an executed prior di-
rective, however, particularized inquiry into the patient's atti-
tudes toward life-prolonging treatment would necessarily draw 
courts into fact-finding about "religious precepts." 
Where the incompetent patient had not executed an ad-
vance directive or health care proxy, state specification of auto-
matic rules for proxy designation would be sufficiently "neutral" 
to satisfy the Jones v. Wolf stricture. But this automatic designa-
tion would only solve the First Amendment religion clause prob-
lems; the very feature that rendered this designation adequately 
"neutral" is its complete irrelevance both to the specific issues in 
the family dispute and to the prior preferences of the incompe-
tent patient in favoring one or another family member in this 
dispute. This irrelevance is, however, precisely the reason al-
ready discussed that this "automatic" resolution of the family 
dispute is constitutionally invalid on grounds of arbitrariness.60 
These, then, are the three pathways that lead to constitu-
tional protection from state-imposed termination of life-
prolonging treatment for an incompetent patient when even one 
family member disagrees with this course. To protect the indi-
vidual right to choose termination, substantial doubt must be ac-
knowledged about whether the incompetent patient would have 
wanted treatment withdrawn in the face of disagreement by even 
58. 443 u.s. 595 (1979). 
59. ld. at 604. 
60. See text accompanying notes 31-33, supra. 
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one family member-unless the patient had explicitly antici-
pated the possibility of this disagreement and appointed some 
other member as the dispositive decision-maker. To protect the 
right of family members to preserve their relationships against 
state termination, the refusal of one member to acquiesce in 
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment must be honored 
(whereas even the unanimous family agreement to terminate 
treatment does not command comparable state respect because 
this decision, however justifiable in its own terms, is not in the 
service of preserving a familial relationship). To protect the fam-
ily from intrusive state investigation, disagreements within the 
family about withdrawing treatment must be respected as such; 
the religious doctrinal foundation of large numbers of such dis-
putes provides additional reason for state abstention from de-
tailed scrutiny or, a fortiori, from dispositive resolution. 
Each of these three pathways independently supports the 
right of family privacy from state-imposed termination of life-
prolonging treatment. Taken together, these three mutually rein-
force and amplify the basis for this constitutional claim. 
III. CLINICIANS' BURDENS IN RESPECTING 
FAMILY PRIVACY 
Family disputes about terminating life-prolonging treatment 
for an incompetent family member are invariably painful for 
everyone involved. Health care clinicians who regularly confront 
such disputes are not immune to this pain. To the contrary, their 
regular involvement can be cumulatively wearing. Whatever ef-
fort they may feel impelled to exert to defend themselves against 
this pain brings its own difficulty because the defense in itself 
may feel like a betrayal of the medical profession's commit-
ment-in principle, if not always or easily in practice-to remain 
engaged with and supportive of family's grief at the imminent 
death of their loved one. A legal rule that automatically awards 
proxy appointment to one among the disputants thus has consid-
erable attractions for clinicians by quickly ending the family dis-
pute and relieving them of any professional obligation to remain 
engaged through extended conversation, negotiation, and plead-
ing with recalcitrant family members. 
Clinicians know, however, in their heart of hearts, that 
forced resolution of a family dispute leaves unreconciled mem-
bers with a burden of anger against other disputants that is likely 
to complicate their grief. Clinicians know, in their heart of 
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hearts, that prolonged involvement with families nursing them 
toward consensus is the best kind of caretaking, the best way to 
honor their professional obligations as caretakers. Even if the 
law may appear to relieve them of their obligations, good clini-
cians know that forced resolution is not good for the families of 
their patients and, for this reason in itself, is unlikely to honor 
the prior preferences of their incompetent patients. 
The fact is, moreover, that the laws in many jurisdictions 
implicitly (and some even explicitly) already require family una-
nimity before life-prolonging treatment can be terminated, and 
there has been no vocal outcry among clinicians in those jurisdic-
tions about difficulties in coping with family conflict. Though 
most state statutes do provide for automatic proxy appointment 
of single family members, five states-Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, 
Michigan and Wyoming-explicitly provide for appointment of 
multiple family members based on their individually expressed 
wish to serve as proxies.61 Even for the states that provide auto-
matic appointment from a hierarchical list, when spouses are un-
available the statutes move to potentially multi-member catego-
ries (adult children or parents or adult siblings of the 
incompetent patient). (Most Americans die in their 70s, and 
men's life expectancy is some six years less than women's; thus 
automatic proxy appointments for incompetent elderly widows 
frequently devolve on adult children or siblings.62) For multi-
member proxies such as adult children, some ten states explicitly 
provide that disputed termination decisions should be resolved 
by majority vote.63 Most states, however, eschew this weirdly 
formalist response. ("Let's have a show of hands. Okay ... three 
to two for pulling the plug on Mom's respirator ... Let's do it."). 
Most states say nothing about the resolution of conflict among 
proxies in multi-member categories, thus implicitly requiring 
unanimity before termination. 
If substantial numbers of clinicians had been unable to deal 
with familial conflicts within these multi-member classes, some 
evidence for this and medical demand for statutory revisions 
61. Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 15-18.5-101 to -1033; Idaho: Idaho Code§ 39-
4303; Indiana: Ind. Code Ann. § 16-36-1-1 to -14 (West 2005); Michigan: Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 333.5651 to 5661, particularly § 333.5653(g) and .5655(b); Wyoming: Wyo. 
Stat.§ 3-5-209 and§ 35-22-105. 
62. See Committee on Care at the End of Life, Institute of Medicine, Approaching 
Death: Improving Care at the End of Life (Marilyn Field & Christine Cassel, eds.) (Na-
tional Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997) at 35. 
63. See, e.g., Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993), § 5 (c); Fla. Stat. 
§ 765.401(1)(c), (e) (2000). 
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would surely have surfaced; but there is no such protest and 
from all appearances clinicians are able to cope.64 
Requiring family unanimity before terminating an incompe-
tent patient's life-prolonging treatment is thus not only required 
by constitutional principles of respect for the patient's prior 
wishes and of family privacy from state coercion. This require-
ment also follows from clinicians' professional role obligation to 
alleviate rather than exacerbate family grief through forced reso-
lution of family disputes. 
IV. A ROLE FOR CONGRESS IN PROTECfiNG 
FAMILY PRIVACY 
None of the courts, either state or federal, enlisted in Terri 
Schiavo's case were presented with the constitutional arguments 
that I have set out here for invalidating Florida's law providing 
for judicial resolution of the family dispute about her treatment. 
This is not surprising; even though I believe I have set out a 
strong case for this result, there is no slam-dunk constitutional 
law precedent directly on point. The very novelty of the argu-
ments does, however, mean that courts remain free to consider 
them in the inevitable next case of intra-familial conflict about 
terminating life-prolonging treatment. 
This blank judicial slate presents a further opportunity-
that Congress could enact legislation under its Section 5 author-
ity to "enforce ... the provisions" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.65 In its recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has been 
quite restrictive in construing the extent of this congressional au-
thority. These restrictive constructions can be distilled into two 
propositions: where the Court and Congress disagree about the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's judgment 
always prevails; and the Court is not obliged to give any defer-
ence whatsoever to Congress's view of the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment.66 These propositions do not mean, however, 
that Congress is barred from acting on its own interpretation of 
its Section 5 authority where, as in this context, no court has pre-
64. For general data about the prevalence of family conflict regarding termination 
of life-prolonging treatment and clinician capacity to assist resolution of this conflict, see 
supra notes 22 and 29. 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 
66. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 5(17 (1997), United States v. Morrison, 529 
u.s. 598 (2000). 
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viously invalidated-much less, even ruled on-this interpreta-
tion. 
There is, moreover, good reason for courts to give some in-
dependent weight to congressional judgment in considering 
whether a constitutional principle of family privacy forbids state 
intervention to resolve intra-familial disputes about terminating 
life-prolonging treatment. There are clear financial implications 
for such constitutional ruling. There is no systematically gath-
ered data available to determine the number of patients whose 
families disagree about the continuation of life-prolonging 
treatment, either currently or in the relevant recent past. Con-
gress has better capacity than courts for gathering such data. 
More importantly, if Congress concludes that an important na-
tional purpose is served by forbidding states from imposing 
treatment termination in the face of familial objection, Congress 
should be willing to allocate federal funds to meet whatever 
medical costs might follow from this conclusion. Legislation pro-
viding federal funds to support the exercise of a constitutional 
right would fit more comfortably within the current constrictions 
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress might 
also, more modestly, invoke its spending power to condition 
state receipt of funds on their adoption of a rule requiring family 
consensus to terminate an incompetent patient's life-prolonging 
treatment. 67 
There are adequate reasons for a court independently to 
conclude that the Constitution requires continuation of this 
treatment for so long as any family member insists; and for judi-
cial vindication of constitutional norms, financial implications 
are irrelevant. But if Congress pledges federal financial re-
sources to support the claimed right, this should be relevant to 
judicial construction of the existence of such right-not because 
it would thereby be a fiscally manageable cost but because the 
pledge in itself signifies a broadly held public moral consensus 
about the importance of vindicating such right. As the Court has 
held in other contexts,68 the existence of legislative enactments is 
67. Congressional spending power is not immune from constitutional limitations. 
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). But if Congress may use its commerce 
power to preempt state laws permitting medical use of marijuana, as the Supreme Court 
recently held in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), there could surely be no bar to use 
of congressional spending power to induce state adoption of this rule for termination of 
life-prolonging medical treatment. 
68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (execution of juveniles); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded persons). 
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relevant evidence to support judicial construction of constitu-
tional rights. 
At the last stages of the Schiavo case, Congress acted to in-
volve the federal courts in determining whether constitutional 
rights would be violated by the removal of her feeding tube. The 
congressional intervention was, however, only jurisdictional; 
Congress explicitly disavowed any substantive mandate for a 
constitutional ruling in the case.69 The prospect remains open for 
the Congress to return to its consideration of the issues raised by 
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo's case-but, this time, to pro-
ceed at a more stately deliberative pace and, this time, to speak 
substantively in support of a constitutional claim for family pri-
vacy. 
69. See Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Or. 2005). 
